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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20000884-CA

vs.
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a sentence for attempted joy riding with intent to
temporarily deprive owner, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN.

§ 41-la-1314 (1997) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1973), in the Third

Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Should this court adjudicate the merits of defendant's appeal, where
defendant is a fugitive from the law?

This is a question of law, reviewable for correctness. See Hardy v. Morris,
636 P.2d 473 (Utah 1981).
2. Did the trial court err when it found that defendant, who had notice of his
sentencing hearing and was free to attend, was voluntarily absent?
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991). Review of factual findings is for
clear error. See id. Whether a defendant has voluntarily absented himself is a
question of fact reviewed for clear error. See Johnson v. State, 604 S.W.2d 927,
929 (Ark. 1980) (finding of voluntary absence not "clearly wrong"); Frost v. United
States, 618 A.2d 653, 657 (D.C. 1992) (finding of voluntary absence not "clearly
erroneous"); cf. State v. Reed, 992 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (review of
voluntary absence determination for abuse of discretion").
3. Should this Court adopt the novel rule, not asserted below, that a trial
court may only sentence a voluntarily absent defendant if he was previously warned
that sentencing could proceed in his absence?
This is a question of law, and review is for correctness. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at
1049.
4. Did the district court have an affirmative duty to expressly solicit
information in mitigation, where defense counsel was present, but made no request
to present information and did not object to sentencing without it?
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A question of law, this issue is reviewed for correctness. Id.
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant to the
statutory indeterminate term?
An appellate court "will not reverse or modify a sentence prescribed by law
unless it is clearly excessive or unless the trial court abused its discretion." State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). "The appellate court can properly find
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by
the trial court." Id. at 887.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 18, 2000, defendant was charged with unlawful control over a motor
vehicle with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314. On August 8
defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful control over a motor vehicle, a class
A misdemeanor. R. 63:5. The trial judge accepted his plea, released him to pretrial
services, told him to make an appointment with Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P)
for preparation of a presentence report (PSI), and notified him of his sentencing
hearing on September 22, 2000. R. 63:5, 7-8.
Defendant failed to appear at AP&P as instructed. R. 41. Pre-trial services
notified the court that defendant had not reported and they had been unable to

3

contact him. R. 34. The court revoked defendant's release and issued a nonbailable bench warrant for his arrest. R. 39.
Defendant also failed to appear at sentencing. R. 64:2. Noting defendant's
two failures to appear and the warrant for his arrest, the court found that defendant
had voluntarily failed to appear. Id. The court then sentenced him in absentia to
the statutory one-year indeterminate term. Id.
Defense counsel timely appealed defendant's conviction. R. 47. Defense
counsel concedes that defendant's name did not appear on the jail roster for Salt
Lake County on the day his opening brief was filed. Br. Aplt. at 25 n.4. Defendant
is apparently still at large, as the district court docket does not indicate a subsequent
recall of the bench warrant for defendant's arrest. Docket, Third District Court-Salt
Lake, Case No. 001906887 (Addendum, attached).1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to the probable cause statement, defendant was at his girlfriend's
home, became drunk and angry, and drove away in her car without her permission.
R. 3. Defendant's relative telephoned the following day and gave the girlfriend the
vehicle's location. She then retrieved the vehicle. Id.
!

The State requests that this Court take judicial notice of the trial court docket in
this case as permitted by Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Riche v. Riche,
784 P.2d 465,468 (Ut. App. 1989) (court "may take judicial notice of the records and
prior proceedings in the same case"); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.,
758 P.2d 451, 456 & n.4 (Ut. App. 1988) (appellate court may take judicial notice to
affirm).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Defendant is a fugitive from justice. He is not entitled to call upon this
Court to decide his appeal.
2. The trial court properly sentenced defendant in absentia. Its finding that
defendant was voluntarily absent is not clearly erroneous.
3. A trial court may properly sentence a voluntarily absent defendant even
though he has not been warned that sentencing may proceed in his absence.
4. Although a trial court must allow defense counsel to present mitigating
information, the court has no affirmative duty to expressly solicit mitigating
information or request that defense counsel make a presentation.
5. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it sentenced
defendant to the statutory term. Defendant has pointed to no relevant information
the court failed to consider. Further, defendant has not demonstrated that the
sentence was one that "no reasonable man" would have imposed.
ARGUMENT
Point I
Defendant, a fugitive from justice, cannot call
on this Court to decide his appeal.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant in
absentia and requests that this Court vacate his sentence. Br. Aplt. at 14, 31.
Defendant, who was free on release, did not appear at sentencing and has not
5

subsequently appeared. Although the court has issued a bench warrant for his
arrest, he remains at large. Because defendant is a fugitive from justice, this Court
should decline to adjudicate his claims.
Under "the settled rule of Hardy v. Morris" a fugitive defendant "places
himself beyond the reach of the judicial system and any ruling cannot be enforced
against him; therefore, he should not be allowed to pursue an appeal while out of
custody." State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985) (citing Hardy, 636 P.2d at
473).2 "The dismissal of such an appeal is justified on the theory that the [fugitive]
should not be allowed to reap the benefit of a decision in his favor when the state
could not enforce a decision in its favor." Hardy, 636 P.2d at 474.
Defendant, who was conditionally released to pre-trial services, did not appear
for either preparation of his presentence report or for sentencing. While a bench
warrant for his arrest has issued, defendant is still at large. Assuming he remains at
large, he cannot claim the privilege "to call upon the resources of the Court for
determination of his claims." Id.
Defendant states that Tuttle "call[s] the holding of Hardy into question." Br.
Aplt. at 27. It does not. Tuttle merely held that a defendant may be entitled to

2

Similarly, in the federal courts, "[i]t has been settled for well over a century that
an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice
during the pendency of his appeal." Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234,
239(1993).
6

reinstatement of his appeal after he has been returned to custody.3 Tuttle neither
rejected nor undermined Hardy's rule. The Tuttle court simply stated that "[o]nce
Tuttle was returned to custody, this Court's power again extended to Tuttle and the
rationale of Hardy no longer applie[d]." 713 P.2d at 704. In the case at bar, in
contrast, defendant has not been returned to custody, and the rationale of Hardy
therefore does apply.
Defendant also attempts to distinguish Hardy, where the defendant was an
escaped prisoner, from this case because here "[defendant] has not escaped . . . .
[defendant] simply did not appear at sentencing." Br. Aplt. at 28. Further,
defendant argues, Hardy escaped after he had initiated his appeal; defendant's
appeal was initiated during his absence. Id.
While the procedural posture of this case differs slightly from that in Hardy,
the difference is irrelevant. In this case, as in Hardy, defendant has "placed himself
outside the control of the judicial system" and "a ruling adverse to him cannot be
enforced." 636 P.2d at 474. Hardy, in fact, made no distinction between the

z

Tuttle rejected the reasoning of State v. Brady, 655 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1982),
that an escaped defendant had "abandoned his appeal," thereby foreclosing reinstatement
of the appeal upon his return to custody. Tuttle held that appeals "may be reinstated
unless the State can show that it has been prejudiced by the defendant's absence and the
consequent lapse of time." 713 P.2d at 705. State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255 (Utah
1996), illustrates the exception. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court's
denial of Verikokides' motion for a new trial, despite his argument that the loss of a trial
transcript made meaningful appeal impossible. Id. at 1255. Any loss of a meaningful
appeal was the "unavoidable result of his long absence from the jurisdiction." Id. at
1258.
7

appeals of criminal defendants who fail to surrender themselves after they have been
freed on bail and those who escape, citing and quoting from cases in both postures.
See id. (citing Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (failure to
surrender after release on bail) and Golden v. State, 243 S.E.2d 303, 304 (Ga. App.
1978) (escape)).
Finally, defendant argues that State v. Moya, 815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App.
1991), supports appellate review of Samora's claims. Br. Aplt. at 28. It does not.
Moya, which addressed a unique and convoluted factual scenario, is wholly
distinguishable. Nothing in the Moya record substantiated the claim that Moya was
a fugitive from the Utah justice system. 815 P.2d at 1313 n.l. Moya never escaped
custody in Utah. Id. Whether he was absent from supervision was "irrelevant''
where "supervision over him terminated by operation of law long before his alleged
fugitive status arose." Id.
Defendant, on the other hand, is a fugitive from justice. Supervision over him
did not terminate: rather, he did not conform to the requirements of his supervised
release and did not appear.
In sum, Hardy controls this case. Defendant, a fugitive from justice, cannot
call on this Court to decide his appeal. No precedent cited by defendant
distinguishes Hardy.

8

Point II
The trial court properly sentenced defendant in absentia.
Defendant states that the record does not establish a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to be present and defend at sentencing. Br. Aplt. at 15. In
support of this claim, defendant appears to argue that the record does not
demonstrate that he was voluntarily absent. See Br. Aplt. at 15. Defendant's
argument on this point is a challenge to the court's finding of fact, and appellate
review is for clear error.4 See Johnson v. State, 604 S.W.2d at 929; Frost v. United
States, 618 A.2d 653, 657 (D.C. 1992).

defendant mistakenly relies on State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App.
1996), for the applicable standard of review. See Br. Aplt. at 2. Citing Ham, defendant
argues that whether he was or was not voluntarily absent should be reviewed for
correctness. Ham applies the correctness standard to the ultimate issue of whether
consent to search has been voluntarily given. Whether consent has been voluntarily given
is not a mere question of fact, i.e., of whether a defendant agreed to a search, but requires
that the court consider whether the defendant's agreement was sufficiently uncoerced to
be treated as legally voluntary. When reviewing the voluntariness of a consent to search,
the appellate court must balance "the legitimate need for such searches and the equally
important requirement of assuring an absence of coercion." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Voluntariness in the context of a defendant's absenting
himself from trial, on the other hand, requires no review for coercion and no balancing of
competing interests. It is, rather, a mere factual inquiry.
Further, even if the question were a mixed question of law and fact, defendant
could not meet the "plain error" standard applicable for unpreserved claims. Error, if any,
was not obvious for the same reasons it was not clear. Additionally, error is not obvious
where "no settled appellate law" should have guided the trial court. State v. Ross, 951
P.2d 236, 239 (Ut. App. 1997). Defendant has pointed to no Utah precedent suggesting
that a defendant, having notice of his sentencing hearing and released from custody, may
not be found voluntarily absent.
9

The controlling case in this jurisdiction is State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107
(Utah 1996). In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant is
voluntarily absent when he receives notice of the hearing and is "free to attend" in
the sense that he is "not incarcerated elsewhere." Id. at 1110.
The record in this case indicates that defendant had notice and was not
incarcerated. Defendant and his counsel both received notice of the sentencing date
and time at the plea hearing. R. 63:8. Defendant was released from custody on
August 28, 2000, almost a month before sentencing. R. 34. The trial court's
finding that defendant was voluntarily absent is therefore not clearly erroneous.
Furthermore, in determining whether a defendant is voluntarily absent, this
Court has implicitly held that its review of a trial court's voluntariness decision may
extend to evidence developed subsequent to the trial court's ruling. See State v.
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 988 (Ut App. 1989) (reviewing affidavit filed with motion
for a new trial eight months after trial in absentia). This approach is also consistent
with the express holdings of other jurisdictions. Reasoning that the validity of a
trial court's voluntariness decision will be clearer in hindsight, these jurisdictions
hold that appellate courts may consider evidence not before the trial court. See, e.g.,
Moore, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc). To exclude postruling evidence would make it difficult for a defendant to show involuntary absence
when moving to correct an illegal sentence. See id. Likewise, to preclude such
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evidence would hinder an appellate court's ability to accurately review the trial
court's finding of voluntariness. See id.
In the instant case, post-sentencing entries in the district court docket
demonstrate that defendant has made no effort to contact the court to explain his
absence. See Docket, Third District Court-Salt Lake, Case No. 001996887. The
court's bench warrant, issued on September 20, 2000, remains outstanding.
Finally, Anderson implicitly holds that a defendant who has notice and is not
incarcerated carries the burden of proffering some "sound reason" to support a
contention that his absence was not voluntary. 929 P.2d at 1100; see also Wagstajf,
772 P.2d at 990) ("If [defendant's] absence is deliberate without a sound reason, the
trial court may start in his absence."). Anderson's implicit holding is consistent
with precedent in other jurisdictions expressly holding that a defendant, having
notice of his trial or sentencing proceeding and not incarcerated, has the burden of
at least proffering some evidence that his absence was involuntary. See United
States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that where defendant
knew trial date and where no evidence suggested an enforced absence, defendant
"ha[d] the burden of going forward and offering evidence to refute the
[voluntariness] finding of the trial court"); State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 277
(Minn. 1998) (holding that a "defendant bears the burden of showing that his or her
absence from trial was voluntary"); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. Ct.
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App. 1981) ("When a defendant is free on bond and does not appear at the time
specified, it is presumed, until established otherwise, that his absence is voluntary
for the purpose of deciding whether he has waived his right to be present at trial.");
Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d at 261 ("Absent any evidence from the defendant to
refute the trial court's determination that his absence was voluntary, we will not
disturb the trial court's finding.").
In the instant case, defendant had notice and had been released from custody.
He did not, however, proffer any reason for his absence from sentencing. He did
not meet the burden of going forward to present some "sound reason" for his
absence.
In sum, the trial court did not clearly err in finding defendant voluntarily
absent. The record demonstrates both that defendant had notice of sentencing and
that he was free to attend in the sense that he was not incarcerated. Evidence
developed after sentencing supports the trial court's finding. Finally, defendant did
not, either at sentencing or at any time thereafter, proffer a reason for his absence.
Nothing in the record suggests that defendant's absence was involuntary.
Point III
A trial court may sentence a voluntarily absent defendant even though
he has not been warned that sentencing may proceed in his absence.
Defendant argues that sentencing cannot proceed, even though a defendant
may be voluntarily absent, unless he has been warned that he can be sentenced in
12

absentia. See Br. Aplt. at 15. Defendant asserts that a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to presence is not possible without a warning. See id.
To establish plain error, as defendant must since the claim is unpreserved, he
must show that (i) an error occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error
was harmful. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
Error, if any, was not obvious. "Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial
court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court:' See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). No Utah precedent
imposes a warning requirement.
In any event, no error occurred. Defendant's insistence on a warning
requirement is, in fact, inconsistent with Utah precedent. Anderson details the Utah
law controlling waiver of the right to presence. Under Anderson, voluntary
absence—absence after notice where the defendant is free to attend in the sense that
he is not incarcerated elsewhere—effects a waiver. "[A] defendant not accused of a
capital crime waives his right to be present at sentencing by voluntary absence."
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. No warning is required.5
5

Defendant attempts to distinguish Anderson, arguing that no warning was required
because of its unique procedural posture. The court, however, never entertained the
possibility that a warning might be required. Rather, the Anderson court explained how,
under the unique circumstances surrounding the case, sentencing was permissible without
actual notice to defendant.
The propriety of sentencing in absentia arose in the trial court after Anderson
moved for permission to leave the state to visit his parents. The court granted his motion
upon Anderson's written and oral agreement to be tried in absentia should he fail to
13

The Anderson holding relied on and is consistent with the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 22(b) states: "On the same grounds that a defendant may
be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's
absence." Rule 17(a)(2) details those grounds: in non-capital cases, "the
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present."
Neither Anderson nor the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure make waiver
contingent on defendant's having been warned that he may be tried in his absence.
Further, public policy considerations militate against requiring a warning.
Anderson explains some of the practical considerations that favor sentencing
in absentia. These include the possibility that "a defendant might. . . absent himself
for years," during which a judge might go on to other assignments or retire, trial

appear for trial. Anderson failed to appear and was tried and sentenced in his absence.
929P.2datll08.
On appeal Anderson admitted waiving his right to be present a trial, but objected
to his sentencing in absentia. He argued that the sentencing procedure violated his rights
to due process and to allocution. On review, the Utah Supreme Court held that he had
voluntarily absented himself and waived his right to be present at sentencing. After
explaining that a defendant must generally have notice and be free from custody, the court
held that Anderson, who did not have notice of the sentencing proceeding, had
nevertheless waived his right to presence by his voluntary absence. The court found that
Anderson's lack of notice was attributable to his own misconduct. "Had he maintained
contact with pretrial services and with his attorney, as was his duty, he would have known
of the sentencing date." Id. at 1111.
14

records could be'lost or destroyed, victims might move, or trial counsel could die
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 At the very least, "it would be a waste io iudk ial
resoiinvs tn rrpt\il j ,eiikiK iinjj" luiiiiii|j iimpl'i dm il | i|| di'lmdanl • i<ipini

Id.

"The result defendant seeks, i.e., a ruling that sentencing cannot proceed for
lack of warning, could force rht- inal courts to deal *vith every one of the practical
problems that Anderson sets IOI.K

ad a court inadvertently fail to grv e a
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reason—and w^*,^ wieclose, at least until his apprehension, further proceedings in
the court.
Defendant argues for a warning requirementu lying on liuua Mates v.
Mt : Phet m,

?9 (DX

)

Anderson's reliance —McPfierson requires that defendant be given notice, or
warned, that sentencing will occur even if he does not appear, Br. Aplt. at 8
Anderson, however, meiuly ichcd on MiPherson foi the proposition that a
"defendant mm ( In /r iHi-

»f pi H cedin^s "

Furthermore, McPherson was effectively overruled by Taylor v. Lnited States
^j>aylor JJ^ 4 | ^ y g

* ric\ni\

M-Pherson, wrho was released on bail during trial

and l.iilrnl I iiii'liiiiiri " M tiiinil IIIIII ill i IIIIIII i I in ippi ill llic ippdlalr i mill ini uisi ill,
hold-

oon ma\ not have intentionally relinquished his right to be

present, testify, and confront I he witnesses against him. Because he had not been

warned that trial could continue without him, the court vacated the judgment and
remanded for a determination of whether McPherson knew in fact that trial could go
on without him. 421 F.2d at 1130-31.
The dissent argued that the issue was not whether McPherson knew that trial
could proceed in his absence, but whether he knew he had a right to be present and
waived it. Id. at 1131.
In United States v. Taylor (Taylor I), 478 F.2d 689 (1 st Cir.) (aff'd, 414 U.S.
17 (1973)), also a case where the defendant absented himself mid-trial, the appellate
court adopted the reasoning of the McPherson dissent. If a "defendant knew or
should have known that he had a right to be present, his voluntary absence . . . [is] a
waiver of that known right." Id. at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted). No
warning that sentencing will continue in a defendant's absence is necessary because
"[t]he very statement that a trial will continue or commence at a fixed time, when
coupled with knowledge of one's right to be present at trial, implies that the
continuation of the trial, at least in non-capital cases, does not depend on his
presence." Id.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Taylor and affirmed.
The Supreme Court, like First Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected Taylor's argument
that "his mere voluntary absence from his trial [could not] be construed as an
effective waiver . . . unless it is demonstrated that he knew or had been expressly
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warned by the trial court nut oni> ihat he had a right to be present but also that the
trial would continue in his absence." Taylor II, 414 U.S. at 19. Like the court
brit""", |iie '"""'ii'utint1 "i .Mill h und I'ut the issue was "the right to be present" and that
"that right w;is effectively w \\\ i <1 In |l'u icfendanf'-f

,l

"I • "' in, il^^rncr " <' i

20. Hie Court determined that no warning was required and reiterated that "a trial
may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going
f

Hows the reasoning or laxi.jr i and

rejects the analysis ui uie McPhcr\

?

IVhfcmlimt\ irhamv nil WI'/VJI'MHH

*

is therefore una\ ailing
Defendant also suggests that Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993)
s

s Supreme

Court ca^e,

picicu ixuic t j ui Qic Jhedcr ;!

f

•

Crosby, the Court held rliar F ale 43, a r vre a _::ivdve rule i:^:i ib Utah
counterpart, proscribes the commencement of a trial in a defendant's absence. The
L

•
... a defendant's absence.

Auv

imencemem

i

case was decided on the basis of statute and aid

not reach any constitutional claim. The case did not address a warning requirement
• 11nl dues UN HI Mipporl flciciidaiit's argument tnai warning is lequired
Crosby and Taylor an liiiiliiii i umisis-lent ^uli iln i iiiiiniiiii m inn m hiiiim i iiiif
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. While the rule requires a defendant's

presence at the commencement of trial, the right to presence may be waived by
absence during the continuation of trial and at sentencing:
The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the
verdict, and the imposition of sentence, will not be prevented and the
defendant will be considered to have waived the right to be present
whenever a defendant, initially present at trial, or having pleaded guilty
or nolo contendere,
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or
not the defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to
remain during trial),
(2) in a noncapital case, is voluntarily absent at the imposition of
sentence, or
(3) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will
cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in
conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b).
The federal rule therefore permits sentencing in absentia where a defendant
has pleaded guilty and then voluntarily absents himself from sentencing. While the
rule requires a warning to disruptive defendants, it requires no warning that
sentencing will proceed if the defendant voluntarily absents himself. The advisory
committee notes explain the rationale behind the rule. "Delay in conducting the
sentencing hearing [when a defendant voluntarily flees before sentence is imposed]
may result in difficulty later in gathering and presenting the evidence necessary to
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formulate a guideline sentence."6 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 advisory committee's
notes (1995 amendment

^ l e rationale also Mippo?-ts Vuh law permitting

.cnfenaiijj11, in jLvsci

» a tie feudal it volt ;ari., ai^cats himself—the law set

forth in Anderson and R
In sum, Utah law permits the trial court to sentence in absentia a defendant
v .»i, »>> \oiUi,ianly absent from sentencing
I

, ..

court m;iv proceed to senten* St

T

A~iere a defendant has notice of the

v icioie iree to attciKi. ;>ui aces not, the
\

•

* as His

right to be present. He need not be warned that sentencing will proceed in his
absence.
!lli twill II'II

'i

('In iili;;li:in,ldiiii""s argument il *\ou!d, in etiect, impose a

new affirmative duty on trial courts arccpfinii, i»iii|lti |I,I<M*, n- i-n^iing guiliv i culii i;to warn all unincarcerated defendants of the possibility of sentencing in absentia.
.Failure to give the warning would preclude imposition of sentence whenever
defendants

.

""i< nil Il niipiina defendants

eat "the

Ruie 43, as currently codified, permits sentencing, but not commencement of a
trial, in a defendant's absence. The rule undermines defendant's argument that presence
is more important at sentencing than at trial. See Br, Aplt, at 10. The federal cases cited
by defendant in support of this argument interpreted a former version of Rule 43
Compare United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and United States
v. Turner, 532 F. Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D. Ca. 1982) (both cited by defendant) with
United States v. Jordan, 216 F.3d 1248, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2000) and United States v.
DiPrima, 165 F.R.D. 61 (E.D. Va. 1996) (both interpreting Rule 43 as amended in 1995).
Ilitir holdings are inconsistent with the current version of the rule, and their statements of
policy support a position that was rejected when the rule was amended.

governmental prerogative" to proceed with a trial, including sentencing. Taylor II,
414 U.S. at 20.
Point IV
The trial court had no affirmative duty to expressly solicit
defense counsel's presentation of mitigating information.
Defense counsel was present at sentencing, made no attempt to present
information in mitigation, and made no objection to sentencing without the
presentation of mitigating information. See R. 42, 64:1-2. Defendant nevertheless
argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a "full and fair sentencing
hearing based on relevant and reliable information." Br. Aplt. at 9. In other words,
defendant argues that the trial court erred because it did not "afford defense counsel
or the prosecutor the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing." Br.
Aplt. at 10.
Specifically, defendant contends that the court erred because Rule 22, Utah R.
Crim. P., states that "the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment." He argues that
this rule imposes upon the court an affirmative duty to invite or solicit such
statements, rather than a duty to allow defendant or his counsel to present
information if they so request. See Br. Aplt. at 10.
In support of this interpretation, defendant cites only State v. Howell, 707 P.2d
115, 118 (Utah 1985). Howell does not support defendant's argument. Affirming a
20

defendant's conviction, the Howell court held that a trial judge may consider
evidence of unconvicted criminal conduct in exercising his decision to fix a
•ivtiinv

I in'.h lniiii III,ml i, IPIH liiiirn, I he LUUII olvicncd Lhat the statutory

predecessor of Rule 22 "direct[ed| trial rmul1 o h m i < nlnui1 hum In I I
defendant and the prosecution" to "insure fairness in the sentencing procedure." Id.
The court also commented, "Pursuant to this provision, trial judges may receive and
("ip^iiipt i

<c un'.'t-' <>l "'Ml ult'iu.'i1 i urn lining I he defendant in hung the penalty to

be imposed for the crime committed." Id. (duply •; in Mi M
Whether the court had an affirmative duty to solicit information in mitigation
was not at issua*-i;

. -^r even the dicta cited by defendant does not support his
'

i

a party protiura it without expresslv ^cestin:*

,

. *JCC;-V v»idciicc -

"
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A trial court' has substantial discretion w «uii_Lictmg a sentencing hearing and
imposing a sentence. Sec State v S mmek% 711 P.2d TOT ^09 (Utah 1986); Howell,
707

*
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'

ruo accretion

by imposing upon the "trial court an affirmative duty to solicit comment from
defense counsel (orfrom,,the prosecution Defense counsel, not the court:,, knows
n hriht.T -.he possesses iriiorniiiiiou niai
evidence; she can object il th
"coach" the parties.

,, oe mitiganng

vie can proffei the
)

Finally, even assuming the trial court had an affirmative duty to request the
presentation of mitigating (and aggravating) information, error in this case is
harmless. Defendant points to no relevant mitigating information not already part of
the record and does not, even on appeal, suggest that such information existed.
Point V
The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it
sentenced defendant to the statutory indeterminate term.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing
sentence without considering relevant and reliable information and that this abuse
constituted "plain error." Br. Aplt at 8-14. Specifically, defendant argues that the
court may not have been aware that defendant's crime involved no violence and was
part of a domestic dispute and, in any case, that the sentence was too severe in light
of his "relatively benign" crime, his employment, and the lack of record evidence of
an extensive criminal history. See Br. Aplt at 12-13.
An appellate court "will not reverse or modify a sentence prescribed by law
unless it is clearly excessive or unless the trial court abused its discretion." State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). "The appellate court can properly find
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by
the trial court." Id, at 887.
Defendant alleges that the sentencing court failed to consider several factors:
that he had been employed at the same place for a year, that the vehicle taken was
22

\u* girlfriend's car, that he had been living with his girlfriend for three years, that he
n permanently deprive her of the vehicle, and that no violence was
involve

,ii I I

I V:l'"iidjiil .isserls lh.il I he sentencing judge could not

have 'known about these factors because the plr.'i vi ,i\ nifnnt hHnrr in*tiiini

ulge

and the plea transcript had not been prepared at the time of sentencing. Id.
A >
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>c lac tors are relevant, defendant does not show that the trial

court tirie *
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the transcript of the plea hearing, ihc probable L

k.

, . <*^er without

statempr

n

statement of defendant in connection with his plea, and defendant's persci««
h •

ais employment, to the victim's being his three-year

domestic partner, and to his L\<II nl 1
See R. 3, 10,. 20-27.
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' rnpin.u«I-, Jepuu, her * f possession.
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the information before it. See State v Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 ("Utah App, W ) .
ot state i;;«, w.v -itense was committed without violence,
AXic

offense, howei. n
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mlnn v \ i mpum ml I mi tin"
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'•ilement recites only that defendant "was drinking[] and became angry/' took ihr
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° '5 Nothing in the record suggests that the sentencing
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,
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i
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perhaps irrelevant. Nothing suggests that the court imposed sentence in belief that
the crime involved violence.
Defendant also argues that the record lacked evidence of an extensive criminal
history. Br. Aplt. at 12-13. Nothing suggests that the court imposed sentence on
the basis of defendant's criminal history. In any case, defendant failed to appear as
ordered for preparation of his PSI. Because defendant refused to cooperate, AP&P
did not prepare a PSI, which would have reflected defendant's criminal record, if
any. He cannot now fault the court for failing to base his sentence on the absence
of an extensive criminal record. Even if his record is minimal, which he does not
assert, defendant did not place that information before the court, either by way of a
PSI or at the sentencing proceeding.
Defendant points to one piece of information that came in during the plea
hearing but was not otherwise part of the record. Br. Aplt. at 11. Defendant was
released to Pre-Trial Services on the condition that he have no contact with the
victim, his former girlfriend. At the plea hearing, defendant stated that he had some
personal property, apparently at her home, that had not yet been returned and that
she was using a cell phone that was in his name. R. 63:6. He asked the judge how
he could secure possession of these items without contacting the victim. Id.
On appeal, defendant apparently suggests that the victim's possession of these
items is a mitigating factor that should have been considered by the sentencing
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judge Defendant apparently believes that the victim's possession of these items in
some way justified his offense

xr

~*u:— : - the record suggests that the victim had

[("fused in in nun IIUM.* itnii1 in

. ..;;y may have been in her possession

simply because defendant had failed u nick the*
relationship with her Farther, nothing suggests that the items had a value even
/.it commensurate wiai rue value of the vehicle taken
!.. .
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possession of a defendant's property is a factor that should
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mitigation Further, even had this been legitimate mitigating information that might
hjw' luTii considered, detendant tailed to identify this or any other factor as
mitigating inform.Hum .iml i ill il In Ihr uiml
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cannot now fault the court: for failing to consider n 'ormaliui: liiai :;u iiiigm uuw
plau-d mi Hi I'ULoiiI had Hit I'M b e e n preparec

rther, h e did n o t a p p e a r at
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might have presented by way of allocution.
counsel, who was present at sentencing, ask to present information
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uncertain claim about the victim • -

igating information—SUCH as -\cn slant's
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his right to present that information and cannot now fault the court for not
considering it.
Defendant's only remaining argument is that the court abused its discretion
because, under the circumstances before the court, his sentence was too harsh.
Defendant can prevail on this argument only if his sentence was one that "no
reasonable man" would impose. See Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887-88. Defendant
points to no precedent suggesting that a one-year indeterminate sentence for
attempted joy-riding is excessive. Further, the sentencing court was entitled to
consider defendant's failures to appear in this case and the likelihood that he was
not sufficiently responsible for probation. See State v. Hoover, 728 P.2d 689, 691
(Ariz. App. 1986) (court "entitled to aggravate appellant's sentence on the basis of
his failure to appear").
In sum, defendant has pointed to no relevant mitigating information that the
sentencing court failed to consider. Even on appeal, defendant has not suggested
any relevant information he might have presented had he appeared at sentencing or
had counsel proffered such information in his behalf. In any event, defendant failed
to appear for preparation of his PSI or at sentencing, thereby waiving his
opportunities for personal input. Further, defense counsel, who was present at
sentencing, proffered no mitigating information. Defendant cannot now fault the
trial court for failure to consider information that he could have, but did not present.

CONCLUSION
Defendant's appeal should be dismissed because he is a fugitive from justice.
.0 hear the appeal, defendant's conviction should be
affirmed.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA
CASE NUMBER 001906887 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 41-1 A-1314 - ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ INTENT TO TEMP
DEPRIVE OWNR (amended)
Class A Misdemeanor Plea: August 08, 2000 Guilty
Disposition: August 08,2000 {Guilty Plea}
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
J. DENNIS FREDERICK
PARTIES
Defendant - MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA
Represented by: JOHN K WEST
casehist. 142 (4%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
UTAH
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA
Offense tracking number: 10982395
Date of Birth: August 21,1958
Jail Booking Number:
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY SHERIFF
LEA Case Number: 00-40295
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: DAO 00007593
Sheriff Office Number: 0103075
Violation Date: March 31,2000 6124 SOUTH 4000 WEST
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due:

4,619.05

Plaintiff- STATE OF

Amount Paid:
0.00
Credit:
0.00
Balance: 4,619.05
TRUST TOTALS Trust Due:
250.00
casehist. 142 (8%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
0.00
Credit:
0.00
Trust Balance Due:
250.00
Balance Payable:
0.00

Amount Paid:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FINE
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CASE NUMBER 001906887 State Felony
A

Amount Due: 4,619.05
Amount Paid:
0.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance: 4,619.05
TRUST DETAIL
casehist. 142 (12%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
Attorney Fees
Recipient: LDA
Amount Due:
250.00
Paid In:
0.00
Paid Out:
0.00

Trust Description:

CASE NOTE
(PTS revoked, no PSI, failed to appear snt 9/22/00-snt in
absentia)
PROCEEDINGS
04-18-00 Note: CASE FILED BY DET BAILESS-SL COUNTY SHERIFF. DEF
NON-JAIL. WARRANT ACTIVATED.
cynthiav

04-18-00 Warrant ordered on: April 18, 2000 Warrant Num: 972111101 Bail
Allowed
cynthiav
Bail amount:
5000.00
04-18-00 Warrant issued on: April 18, 2000 Warrant Num: 972111101 Bail
Allowed
cynthiav
Bail amount:
5000.00
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement.
04-18-00 Case filed by cynthiav
cynthiav
casehist.142 (19%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]06-27-00 Warrant recalled on:
June 27, 2000 Warrant num: 972111101
caroleo
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was
booked.
06-27-00 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on June 28, 2000 at 09:30 AM in
Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT.
caroleo
06-27-00 Judge ARRAIGNMENT assigned.
caroleo
06-28-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel
barbarrs
Judge: ROBIN W.REESE
PRESENT
Clerk: barbarrs
Prosecutor: MERCER, STEPHEN
Defendant
Video
Tape Number:

290 Tape Count: 1687

INITIAL APPEARANCE
The Information is read.
Defendant is arraigned.

casehist.142 (27%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
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APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Legal Defender

Office to represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name: Legal Defender Office
City:
Phone:
ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 07/06/2000
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: To Be Determined
casehist. 142 (32%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
Third District
Court
450 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Before Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT
06-28-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on July 06, 2000 at 02:00 PM in To Be
Determined with Judge BARRETT.
barbarrs
06-28-00 Note: FILED: Affidavit of Indigency - Judge Reese signed and
appointed LDA to represent defendant in this case
joannelb
06-28-00 Note: Bail remain $5,000
joannelb
07-05-00 Filed: Notice of Bond Hearing
mauriem
07-05-00 Filed: Appearance of Counsel by John K. West
mauriem
07-05-00 Filed: formal Request for discovery
mauriem
07-06-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on July 20, 2000 at 02:00 PM in To Be
Determined with Judge ATHERTON.
carmellc
07-06-00 Minute Entry - Roll Call continued
carmellc
Judge: WILLIAM W. BARRETT
PRESENT
Clerk: carmellc
Prosecutor: STOTT, ROBERT L.
Defendant
Defendants Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K
Video
casehist. 142 (41%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
Tape Count: OFF

Tape Number:

CONTINUANCE
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of
Roll Call.
The motion is granted.
Deft has pending charges

2000-40

ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 07/20/2000
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Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: To Be Determined
Third District Court
casehist. 142 (46%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Before Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON
07-06-00 ROLL CALL Continued.
07-20-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call
terryb
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON
PRESENT
Clerk: terryb
Prosecutor: PAUL PARKER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN K WEST
Video
Tape Number:

450 South State

314 Tape Count: 30.94

HEARING
Case set for Preliminary hearing 8/8 before Judge Reese.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 08/08/2000
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - S32
Third District Court
casehist. 142 (54%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
450 South State
SLC,UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: ROBIN W. REESE
07-25-00 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on August 08,2000 at 09:00 AM in
Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE.
terryb
08-08-00 Judge FREDERICK assigned.
marlened

08-08-00 SENTENCING scheduled on September 22,2000 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK.
marlened
08-08-00 Note: Case Bound Over
marlened
08-08-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
marlened
Judge: ROBIN W.REESE
PRESENT
Clerk: marlened
Prosecutor: STOTT, ROBERT L.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K
Video
Tape Number:

TAPE Tape Count: 12:06

Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence
casehist. 142 (63%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
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report.
Change of Plea Note
C/O AMEND TO "ATTEMPTED, CLASS A MISD" ON STATE MOTION
C/O DEFT RELEASED TO PRE-TRIAL SERVICES - NO CONTACT WITH VICTIM /
TO PAY FULL RESTITUTION
CASE BOUNDOVER
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto.
This case is bound over. A Sentencing has been set on 9/22/00 at
08:30 AM in courtroom N41 before Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK.
08-31-00 Filed: Supervised Release Agreement
connieg
09-18-00 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Request for Revocation
cindyb
09-18-00 Filed order: Request & Order for Revocation of Supervised
casehist. 142 (69%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
Release
cindyb
Judge jfrederi
Signed September 18,2000

09-20-00 Notice - WARRANT for Case 001906887 ID 682956
cindyb
09-20-00 Warrant ordered on: September 20,2000 Warrant Num: 972123539
No Bail
cindyb
09-20-00 Warrant issued on: September 20,2000 Warrant Num: 972123539 No
Bail
cindyb
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Issue reason: Pretrial Release Revoked. Defendant Fled.
09-20-00 Filed: MemofromAPP (deft failed to contact APP for PSI upon
releasefromjail 8/28/00)
cindyb
09-22-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMTTME
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK
PRESENT
Clerk: cindyb
Prosecutor: MURPHY, J KEVIN
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorneys): WEST, JOHN K

cindyb

Video
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:25-9:27
casehist.142 (78%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/
INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Commitment is to begin immediately.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine: $2500.00
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casehist.142 (84%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]
Surcharge: $2119.05
Due: $4619.05

Suspended: $0.00

Total Fine: $2500.00
Total Suspended: $0
Total Surcharge: $2119.05
Total Principal Due: $4619.05
Plus Interest
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Pay fine to The Court.
The Court finds defendant voluntarily absented himself from
sentencing proceedings and the Court sentences the defendant in
absentia. Counsel for the State to prepare the findings and order.
Defendant to be committed forthwith upon his arrest on this
Court's bench warrant.
09-27-00 Trust Account created
Total Due:
250.00
cindyb
casehist.142 (90%)[Press space to continue, q to quit, h for help]09-27-00 Fine Account created
Total Due:
4619.05
cindyb
09-28-00 Judgment #1 Entered
theresab
Creditor: LDA
Debtor: MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA
250.00 Attorneys Fee's
250.00 Judgment Grand Total
09-28-00 Filed judgment: Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment @J theresab
Judge jfrederi
Signed September 22, 2000
10-10-00 Filed order: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Sentencing Defendant in Absentia
cindyb
Judge jfrederi
Signed October 10,2000
10-17-00 Filed: Notice of Appeal
rhondam
10-17-00 Filed: Request for Transcript
rhondam
10-18-00 Note: Forwarded Cert/copies of Notice of Appeal, Designation of
Record, Certificate, and Request for Transcript to Court of
Appeals
susanc
10-23-00 Filed: Court of Appeals letter to John K. West - Notice of
Appeal filed with Court of Appeals/COA # 20000884-CA
kathys
10-27-00 Filed: Transcript of hearing 9-22-00
sharonb

10-27-00 Filed: Transcript of hearing 8-8-00

sharonb
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